Vulnerability in the Chokepoint:
Investigating Maritime Robbery in the Singapore Strait

On September 30, 2025, rainclouds and thunderstorms loomed over the Singapore Strait. The air was thick and humid as the Delta Maria, a foreign crude oil tanker sailing under a Maltese flag, navigated the chokepoint of the Phillip Channel. While in the strait, three robbers boarded the 900-foot-long ship, making their way toward the tanker's engine room. They tied up a crewmember, who watched as they stole the ship's spare engines. He ultimately managed to free himself and rushed to notify the ship's master, who raised the alarm and assembled the tanker's crew. A search of the ship revealed the engine spares were the only stolen property. The robbers were nowhere in sight. The ship reported the incident to the Singapore Vessel Traffic Information System, which broadcast a safety warning to all vessels transiting the waters and notified Singaporean and Indonesian authorities. This recent attack is just one of many similar robberies in the region.1

The Singapore Strait is a narrow waterway between Singapore and Indonesia's Riau Islands that plays an essential role in directing trade from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. After 39 incidents of robbery were reported in the strait in 2019,2 the International Maritime Bureau issued its first general warning advising that ships in the strait stay vigilant to the threat of robbery.3 This warning marked the beginning of what would become a surge of attacks within the area. The attacks would more than double by 2025, with 108 reported incidents.4 The evolving strategies used to target ships signify a problem worth addressing for the Singapore Strait and its surrounding regions.

Over 29 percent of the world's oil transits the Singapore Strait, more than any other maritime chokepoint.6 With the volume of ships moving through the strait everyday, shipping companies have not viewed the increase of attacks as a threat worthy of intervention.7 Gregory Poling, director and senior fellow of the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, speaks to the sentiment of the maritime industry: "Some degree of petty theft on board ships, the occasional stealing of cargo or siphoning of oil, is a risk of doing business."8

For insured shipping companies, these incidents do not warrant a significant threat.9 Sayed Fauzen Riyadi, executive director of the Center for Southeast Asia and Border Management Studies at Raja Ali Haji Maritime University (UMRAH), notes that ships are disincentivized from reporting incidents viewed as petty theft because it requires the ship to be halted and searched by local authorities, costing time and money.10 Robbers who board ships often go unnoticed until after they have fled, frequently stealing personal property or spare parts aboard the ship rather than cargo.11 According to the government-to-government agreement towards combating armed robberies known as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), robbers are also known to use mobile devices and maritime tracking services to target the ships.12 This strategy takes advantage of ships' automatic identification system, a radio transpondence system that broadcasts the position, speed, and other details about a ship.13 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires most industry ships to be fitted with AIS, inadvertently allowing robbers to spot their targets before a robbery.14 Bulk carriers are prime targets, accounting for 49% of robberies in 2025.15 Because they transport cargo that is not vulnerable to expiration, bulk carriers tend to operate at slower speeds than other industry ships, making them more fuel efficient and more accessible to robbers.

Riyadi notes that in the early 2000s, maritime robbers aimed for the captain's quarters where money and personal belongings were stored.16 "They only need ten or fifteen minutes to board the ship, find what they're looking for, and then go off the ship," explained Riyadi.17 Within the last five years, robbers have strayed from this tactic, instead heading straight to the engine room in search of spare parts that can later be resold in cities like Jakarta.18

Riyadi emphasizes that this method allows robbers to go unnoticed, avoiding potential violence.19 99 of the attacks reported in 2025 were nonviolent, but dangerous incidents are not zero.20 At least six reported incidents involved crew members being temporarily held hostage.21

While the attacks are primarily nonviolent, the continued development of robbery strategies signals that these groups will continue to become more advanced. John Steed, a former UN senior maritime crime advisor for the Gulf, who has also done hostage negotiations with Somali pirates, sees parallel trends in other regions. "Piracy in West Africa started with robbery at sea, raiding oil supply ships and so on, and then turned into more traditional piracy. There's the potential for escalation, which means you can't ignore it."22

One key difference between the attacks in the Singapore Strait and Somalia is that one occurs in territorial waters, and the other is in international waters — which also differentiates armed robberies from piracy. Because the robberies in the Singapore Strait happen in territorial waters managed by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, it is highly unlikely that the strait will experience attacks of a similar caliber as Somalia.23 Somali piracy does not take place under a national governance, allowing piracy to flourish without proper intervention.24 With Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia all interested in protecting the strait, the armed robberies are not expected to reach proportions like those represented in Somalia.25

Government intervention alone has not been enough to completely neutralize the advancing methodologies behind the attacks in the Singapore Strait. As calculated methodologies come to light, Lee Sorensen, Senior Development Finance and Trade Expert and former director of Shuraako at One Earth Future Foundation (OEF), warns, "Bigger networks of illicit actors, criminal actors, or cartels, are watching the ability to exact crimes on targets. Why would they not be sizing up the ability of these small groups to get away with it, to do bigger and better things?"26 Sorensen, like Steed, emphasizes the need for current action to prevent any caliber of worsening attacks.27

During his time in Somalia, Sorensen has helped establish grassroots solutions at a community level to reduce populations involved in piracy. By identifying the radio as a primary source of entertainment for the local Somali community, particularly youth, the OEF sponsored radio campaigns that generated a stigma against piracy. They also enlisted the help of cultural figures like mothers, clan elders, and tribal leaders to dissuade from the participation in piracy. Sorensen explained that the campaigns used voices of respected people in the community rather than politicians or law enforcement. Similar initiatives tailored to the unique cultural landscape of the Riau Islands, could prevent locals from being recruited by criminal syndicates and halt the advancement of strategies used to rob ships in the Singapore Strait.28

A survey on local fishing communities within the Riau Islands suggests that foreign criminal groups are responsible for recruiting locals into committing acts of piracy.29 Riyadi, who served on the study, explains why the local islanders are prime recruits for the job: "They are the locals who understand the geography. They have to know how to navigate in the dark, they can read the stars, they aren't really afraid of trespassing the ocean at night. They aren't afraid of moving a small ship against those big tankers, or big cargo ships in the region."30 ReCAAP reports that the majority of attacks happen during a dark moon, when it may be difficult for industry ships to spot boats, highlighting the skills that make locals adept for the job.31

While financial gain is a factor, Riyadi points to the sheer quantity of ships transiting the strait as the main catalyst for the attacks in the region.32 Investigations as to why the strait has piqued the interest of criminal groups in recent years are ongoing. Riyadi acknowledges his own research is still uncovering the deeper causes leading to the modern trend.33 As the development of armed robberies persists, Riyadi stresses the importance of maritime education for local communities and governing officials in the region.34 While maritime education has historically been overlooked in Indonesia's curriculum, applying maritime studies to a variety of subjects like history, science, and civics will foster a sense of stewardship among locals.35 School collaborations with maritime institutions can also strengthen this connection.36 In professional settings, maritime education would ensure a concrete understanding of maritime policy while promoting united and coordinated efforts across institutions and nations to combat regional issues.37 Because the strait is governed by three nations, this education could come in the form of standardized training for the maritime workforce which would combat inconsistencies that lead to flawed and disorganized enforcement practices.38 The training will teach valuable skills in regulatory compliance and governing frameworks while promoting values of cooperation and communication across Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, to strengthen maritime affairs.39

As organized criminal groups continue to develop modern tactics to target ships, identifying vulnerabilities unique to the region will inform efforts that combat increasing rates of robberies. Investing in grassroots solutions oriented toward the local culture will aid in establishing a healthy maritime environment for those who depend on the area the most. The introduction of maritime education in schools and governing sectors is one route to promote a culture of agency and responsibility toward the waters while forming a strong framework for managing armed robberies and other maritime crimes in the region. Thoughtful intervention responsive to robbers' strategies and the culture of local communities will address escalating attacks, and foster sustainable, long-term maritime wellbeing in the Singapore Strait.


1. International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS): Piracy & Armed Robbery," Data set, Custom Piracy & Armed Robbery Report, 2026, https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx.

2. International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS): Piracy & Armed Robbery."

3. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) - Commercial Crime Services (CCS), "Piracy and Armed Robbery Prone Areas and Warnings," accessed February 1, 2026, https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-and-armed-robbery-prone-areas-and-warnings/.

4. International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS): Piracy & Armed Robbery."

5. ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), "ReCAAP ISC Annual Report 2025," 2025, accessed March 1, 2026, https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/annual/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202025.pdf.

6. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," EIA.gov, March 3, 2026, accessed April 5, 2026, https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/.

7. Gregory Poling, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard, March 17, 2026, Zoom, United States.

8. Gregory Poling, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

9. Gregory Poling, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

10. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard, April 2, 2026, Zoom, New York, United States and Indonesia.

11. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

12. ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), "ReCAAP ISC Annual Report 2025."

13. International Maritime Organization, "AIS Transponders," accessed April 6, 2026, https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/ais.aspx.

14. International Maritime Organization, "AIS Transponders."

15. International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS): Piracy & Armed Robbery."

16. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

17. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

18. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

19. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

20. ReCAAP, "ReCAAP Data Visualisation Map & Panel (Re-VAMP)," accessed April 12, 2026, https://dashboard.recaap.org/.

21. International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS): Piracy & Armed Robbery."

22. John Steed, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard, March 16, 2026, Zoom, New York, United States and the United Kingdom.

23. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

24. John Steed, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard; Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

25. John Steed, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard; Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

26. Lee Sorensen, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard, March 18, 2026, Zoom, New York, United States and Colorado, United States.

27. Lee Sorensen, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard; John Steed, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

28. Lee Sorensen, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

29. Anup Phayal et al., "Caught in the Net: Unraveling the Piracy-IUU Fishing Milieu in Indonesian Waters Through Survey Data," Political Geography 125 (March 2026): 103449, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2025.103449.

30. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

31. ReCAAP, "ReCAAP Data Visualisation Map & Panel (Re-VAMP)."

32. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard; Phayal et al., "Caught in the Net: Unraveling the Piracy-IUU Fishing Milieu in Indonesian Waters Through Survey Data."

33. Dr. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi, Interview by Maya Anne Fuentes-Stanard.

34. Sayed Fauzan Riyadi and East West Center, "Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Indonesia's Pursuit of Effectiveness," Asia Pacific Bulletin (East-West Center, April 24, 2025), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep69988.

35. Fauzan Riyadi and East West Center, "Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Indonesia's Pursuit of Effectiveness."

36. Fauzan Riyadi and East West Center, "Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Indonesia's Pursuit of Effectiveness."

37. Fauzan Riyadi and East West Center, "Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Indonesia's Pursuit of Effectiveness."

38. Fauzan Riyadi and East West Center, "Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Indonesia's Pursuit of Effectiveness."

39. Fauzan Riyadi and East West Center, "Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Indonesia's Pursuit of Effectiveness."